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This project investigates forms of investment in residential property that began to 
emerge in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis, which have since morphed and firmly 
taken hold. Focused on Philadelphia, PA, the analysis traces the new geographies of real 
estate purchases made specifically by investors who do not intend to live in the homes they 
are buying. The project uses a mixed methods approach to uncover how houses purchased 
as investment vehicles between 2000-2018 have been concentrated spatially, then com-
pares these patterns with the geography of houses that have been purchased as homes. 
The research shows that investors have consistently focused their efforts on Philadelphia 
neighborhoods with a higher proportion of residents of color and lower incomes. Over the 
nineteen-year span of this study it is clear that investor activity not only plays a large role in 
the housing bubble in Philadelphia, but is also continuing to grow as a percentage of overall 
purchases, and is expanding into new areas of the city. Principally, the project reveals that 
the geographies of purchases by investors and owner-occupants are largely distinct –inves-
tor ownership is fueling a separate housing geography and is not merely a part of the overall 
housing market. To take up these complexities I draw together literature on the political 
economic implications of financialization in housing with research on neighborhood-level 
impacts of house 'flipping' as well as the new single-family rental (SFR) asset class. Through 
this research, the project considers the implications of these patterns in a context where, 
facing years of disinvestment, Philadelphia community development organizations and city 
government have largely been eager for the influx of capital brought through speculative 
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I. Introduction
Since 2000, the share of residential properties in the U.S. being purchased as invest-
ment vehicles is continuing to grow and take on new forms. New investment practices have 
figured variously in the housing bubble, subprime mortgage crash, subsequent real estate 
owned property markets, and more recent forms of speculation. In large cities like New York 
and Los Angeles luxury residential real estate development is booming, fueled in large part 
by foreign investment and purchased through shell corporations (Story and Saul 2015). In 
addition, on the lower end of the market, Invitation Homes, a subsidiary of Blackstone, has 
become the nation’s largest landlord of single-family houses. The company, raised $1.5 
billion in its initial public offering in 2017 and, as of the fall of 2019, owns over 80,000 homes 
nationwide (Dezember and Driebusch 2017).1
The scope of these luxury purchases and this consolidated corporate owner are re-
markable. And yet recent reporting indicates that investor driven real estate purchases are 
also on the rise in smaller cities, for cheaper properties, and by a variety of different actors. 
Using data from CoreLogic, a for-profit aggregator of real estate data, The New York Times, 
reported in summer 2019 on the large share of properties in Atlanta being purchased by 
outside investors (Casselman and Dougherty 2019b). In 2018 investors purchased eighteen 
percent of all single-family homes sold in Atlanta, with this activity concentrated in a num-
ber of historically black neighborhoods where the percentage of investor-owned properties 
is even higher. The New York Times shows that this is not limited to Atlanta: in 2018 eleven 
percent of single-family homes nation-wide were purchased by investors, while in cities like 
1 In September Blackstone sold off the last of its shares in the company, cashing out 
with over $7 billion in profits from the venture. Given Blackstone’s instincts for the cutting 
edge of real estate their departure from Invitation Homes raises questions about what’s next 
(Dezember 2019; Lane 2019).
2
Detroit, Philadelphia, and Memphis this figure rises to between twenty and thirty percent. 
As part of the current buzz around “platform real estate,” established tech companies, such 
as Zillow and Redfin, and startups (with ample venture capital backing) like Opendoor and 
Offerpad, are buying up homes in attempts to create an online marketplace for real estate. 
To facilitate this ‘instant buying’ or iBuying, these companies purchase homes, lightly rehab 
them, and then resell them online without the traditional brokers fee, pocketing a portion 
of this savings (Casselman and Dougherty 2019a). In their research on Atlanta, reporters at 
The New York Times also highlight tech ventures like Entera, which are aimed at making it 
possible for small scale out of town investors to purchase homes from a distance like stocks 
or bonds. These investigations signal that there are a growing set of investment practices in 
residential real estate, and corporations are looking for new, faster, and more pervasive ways 
to profit from housing.
Scholarly work on non-occupant investors has largely been motivated by a policy and 
equity focus and aims principally to understand the impacts of investor activity on access 
to housing, neighborhood stability, and the ways in which speculation exacerbates market 
volatility. Growing bodies of research have focused on two areas related to this phenomenon: 
the impacts of investor lending on the subprime crisis, and the role that investors played 
in purchasing real estate owned (REO) properties after the housing market crash. Much of 
this research has been aspatial, and less attention has been paid to more recent activity of 
investors purchasing non-REO properties.
Aiming to contribute to these gaps, this project investigates the spatial dynamics of in-
vestor ownership of residential properties in Philadelphia between 2000-2018. Using a mixed 
methods approach the project uncovers how houses purchased as investment vehicles have 
been concentrated spatially and compares these patterns with the geography of houses that 
have been purchased as homes. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) based meth-
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ods I analyzed publicly available data on real estate tax transfers and land use from the City 
of Philadelphia to discern these patterns of investment; and I conducted semi-structured 
interviews to learn about how this activity has been perceived by the community develop-
ment sphere in the city. My research reveals that the geographies of investor and owner-oc-
cupier purchases are largely distinct – that investor ownership is fueling a separate housing 
geography and is not merely a part of the overall housing market. It uncovers that investors 
have focused their efforts on neighborhoods with a higher proportion of residents of color, 
and lower incomes. Over the nineteen year span of this study it is clear that investor activity 
played a large role in the housing bubble, is continuing to grow as a share of overall purchas-
es, and is expanding into new areas of the city.
In comparing investors and homeowners I do not, however, argue that homeownership 
is a universally desirable and positive outcome. Historically, many Federal Housing Ad-
ministration (FHA) policies aimed at providing affordable housing through homeownership 
can be more accurately described as forms of “predatory inclusion” than as paths towards 
redistributive economic justice (Taylor 2019a). Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor’s recent historical 
account of the impacts of the 1968 Fair Housing Act’s policies that were supposedly aimed 
at reversing decades of racially motivated housing discrimination makes this painfully clear. 
Her work shows how FHA policies “shattered credit and ruined neighborhoods” for working 
class African Americans, precisely while enabling enormous profits for real estate specula-
tors (Taylor 2019a, 4). Not merely an unintended consequence, Taylor argues: “this was cer-
tainly a part of the political economy — and calculation — of the program” (Taylor 2019b). In 
light of this history of supposedly equity-minded policies that fueled private profits instead 
of increasing housing access, it is important to make visible the, often obscure, mechanisms 
of real estate investment at work today.
Racquel Rolnik's work extends Taylor's argument further, where she argues that 
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homeownership through debt in general (not just the racialized FHA policies Taylor speaks 
of) facilitate the financialization of housing as much as they promote access to shelter. 
She argues that the ideology of homeownership "together with the 'socialization of cred-
it', ...supported a double movement: on the one hand, the inclusion of middle- and low-in-
come consumers into financial circuits; on the other, the takeover of the housing sector by 
global finance" (Rolnik 2019, 16). Homeownership through debt is, then, not the opposite of 
speculative investment in housing but rather exists on a continuum with it. And historically 
policies ostensibly promoting homeownership have had a track record of instead primarily 
fueling forms of predatory speculative investment.
Understanding the present extents, and spatial patterns of investor activity is neces-
sary as a way to uncover the newest forms of overlap between profit-making and housing. 
Revealing these geographies and activities is a necessary first step in fighting for housing 
































Figure 2. Residential properties purchased by investors in 2018.
Figure 3. Forty-eight of just over 10,000 homes purchased by investors in 2018.
Images, Google Streetview 2019.
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II. Literature Review: Investors and 
Housing
There is substantial literature on the impacts, patterns, and presence of non-occupant 
investors (here after referred to as investors) in housing markets. The desire to understand 
the role of investors in the subprime mortgage crisis and its aftermath has been a key driv-
er of research on the U.S. context in the past decade. Studies have addressed the impact 
of investors on foreclosures, both in terms of rates and spatial patterns (Gilderbloom et al. 
2012; Lambie-Hanson et al. 2015). Other studies have attempted to gauge the influence of 
spatial or demographic characteristics on investor activity (Ellen, Madar, and Weselcouch 
2015; Rosenblatt and Sacco 2018; Molina 2016; Mallach 2014; Immergluck and Law 2014a). 
Many of these latter studies focused on the role of investors in purchasing distressed or real 
estate owned (REO) properties from 2008 onwards (Mallach 2014; Molina 2016); while others 
focus on how investor activity may have been a driver of the subprime mortgage and ensu-
ing foreclosure crisis (Gilderbloom et al. 2012; Rosenblatt and Sacco 2018; Haughwout et al. 
2011).
Rosenblatt and Sacco aptly characterize recent literature on investor activity as cov-
ering primarily three focus areas: (1) investor activity during housing bubble; (2) the role of 
investor-owned properties in the subprime mortgage crisis; and (3) investor-purchases of 
foreclosed or REO properties after the crash. Scholars have begun to turn attention towards 
more recent patterns and impacts of investor ownership, largely with a focus on the expan-
sion of private equity into single-family rental properties at scale (August and Walks 2018; 
Fields 2017). Newspapers and industry researchers also been active in reporting on these 
new patterns, highlighting that investor ownership has continued to grow, but is no lon-
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ger directly related to REO properties from the subprime mortgage crisis (Casselman and 
Dougherty 2019a; Casselman and Dougherty 2019b; Ralph 2019)
Theorizing Investor Ownership
The role that complex financial instruments tied to mortgage lending played in the 
financial crisis of 2008 cast new light on the links between housing, investment capital, and 
financial markets. Literature which theorizes the role of investors in single-family housing 
(and smaller scale urban multifamily housing of two to four units) focuses primarily on the 
relationship between housing – as shelter and small pieces of land – and speculative fi-
nance and financial forms of value. The cascading impacts that resulted from widespread 
subprime lending, the bundling of those loans into mortgage backed securities, and the 
insurance of those bundles with credit default swaps, revealed new links between specu-
lative finance and the creation and maintenance of housing markets in the U.S. and beyond 
(Sassen 2012).
One key strain of recent work on the role of finance and investment in low density 
residential property highlights that these developments signal a shift towards new ways in 
which homes are treated as chiefly financial assets (and not also as spaces of shelter and 
belonging). Recent scholarship draws on the work that David Harvey began in 1980s on the 
conditions of land in a capitalistic system, where he argues land begins to be evaluated and 
exchanged according, only, to the rent it garners. Under these conditions, Harvey explains, 
"when trade in land is reduced to a special branch of the circulation of interest-bearing 
capital, then, I shall argue, landownership has achieved its true capitalistic form" signaling 
that it is also subject to what Harvey theorizes as the contradictions of overaccumulation 
inherent in capitalism (Harvey 1982, 327). In recent literature Harvey's work has been mobi-
lized to understand new investor dynamics as an ongoing processes of the "financialization" 
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of housing. Manuel Aalbers defines financialization as "the increasing dominance of finan-
cial actors, markets, practices, measurements, and narratives, at various scales, resulting 
in a structural transformation of economies, firms (including financial institutions), states, 
and households" (Aalbers 2019, 31). Within this literature however there is emerging debate 
about the usefulness of the concept. Christophers outlines five axes along which the con-
cept of 'financialization' ought to be evaluated for its limits. He argues that the term may "no 
longer able to tolerate the accumulated weight of the myriad meanings loaded onto it" and 
may obscure or reinvest earlier theorizations by Harvey and other Marxist economists and 
geographers (Christophers 2015, 186).
Nevertheless the frames that financialization literature have opened have been pro-
ductive for theorizing the "new frontiers and new modes of financial rent extraction that are 
emerging" (Fields 2018, 2).
In a recent article, Desiree Fields untangles the motivations, prerequisites, and impli-
cations of the creation of a new 'asset class' of single-family rental (SFR) properties post 
2008. The SFR asset class is exemplified by the fleet of homes purchased by Blackstone and 
other private equity firms. She illustrates the ways that the SFR market serves to return to 
the status quo after 2008. In particular she makes clear that the promotion of SFR by HUD 
was a 'solution' not just to the problem of housing former owners of foreclosed properties, 
but rather that the SFR market also (perhaps principally) has been a way to provide a new 
host for speculative finance capital seeking returns from housing that it had previously 
obtained through mortgage lending and mortgage-backed securities. She argues: "in the 
years since 2008 the state and the financial industry have cooperated to position an institu-
tionalized SFR market as unifying the interests of these parties, bringing this use of repos-
sessed homes to the fore and excluding other possible uses" (Fields 2018, 9). The reason for 
this consensus, in her analysis, is that "the SFR asset class affirms the fundamental role for 
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housing in the ideology of capital by assuring private property ownership, resource alloca-
tion by market exchange, and satisfaction of the accumulation imperative" (Fields 2018, 18).
An interesting component of her analysis focuses on the role of data and geographic 
analysis in the creation of the SFR asset class. Given the diversity of homes, neighborhood 
contexts, and local housing market conditions the project of turning individual homes into 
an asset class required that foreclosed homes and then later single-family rentals could 
become discernible across geographies and comparable. In other words, these properties 
needed be able to be treated as units for purchase. To do this new forms of data and meth-
ods of abstraction were mobilized to create systems for discerning similarity and difference 
across a variegated landscape of foreclosed properties. Fields describes this as "calculative 
agency, or the ability to objectify things to facilitate an orderly process of market exchange)" 
(Fields 2018, 11). Indeed an expanded industry of real estate data providers emerged to pro-
vide this needed analysis, combing through local and state repositories of public information 
on foreclosure starts, property records, tax and eviction filings.
New forms of investment in housing have implications for formulating theories of how 
finance and capital intersect with housing. They also create new everyday realities of hous-
ing access, discrimination, and dispossession. Understanding these two different registers – 
theory on the one hand and the impacts on everyday lives and livelihoods on the other – and 
how they intersect is critical. Stitching these together is one aim of this project.
Tracing Investor Ownership
Interestingly these forms of calculative agency that Fields speaks to have also enabled 
scholars, researchers, and journalists to study the extents and impacts of investor purchas-
es before, during, and after the financial crisis (including researchers using data products 
from the companies like CoreLogic and BlackKnight Financial Services who also supply data 
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to the investment firms that are they subjects of their analysis).
A number of such studies that focus on the role of investors in the lead up to the hous-
ing bubble complicate prevailing narratives on the cause and primary impacts of this crises. 
Likewise studies investigating the aftermath of the crisis and the rise of real estate owned 
(REO) properties have been begun to draw out insights about the impacts that these forms of 
investment are having on neighborhoods.
In what follows I summarize findings from recent research on spatial and demographic 
patterns of investor ownership; the kinds of financing used by investors and the limits that 
these practices pose for research; the varied impacts of investor ownership on neighbor-
hoods; and the methods and data sets used to investigate these dynamics.
Investors as Subprime Borrowers
A handful of key studies have analyzed the role of investors, rather than subprime bor-
rowers, in the housing bubble and subsequent bust. Through this alternative view they have 
been able to recast prevailing narratives of the foreclosure crisis.
Gilderbloom et al. (2012) use the case of Louisville, Kentucky to understand disparities 
in the racial makeup of neighborhoods with high rates of foreclosure. They highlight that 
investor ownership has been largely missing from studies of foreclosure, largely due to lack 
of available data which distinguishes between owner-occupier and investor purchases. They 
posit that adequate analysis of the role of investors has the potential to shift national un-
derstanding of the cause of the foreclosure crisis. Testing against a number of other possible 
explanatory variables (using an ordinary least squares multivariate regression) they find that 
investor foreclosures constitute a high percentage of the total foreclosures in black neigh-
borhoods.
Rosenblatt and Sacco (2018) trace changes in the geography of investor lending 
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through Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data in Cook County between 2000-2010. 
They focus especially on the differences between subprime and prime lending in the lead up 
to the subprime mortgage crisis. They find "investor loans were spatially clustered in ways 
that reflect a dual housing market rooted in racial segregation" (Rosenblatt and Sacco 2018, 
96). Haughwout et al. (2011) also focus on investor activity during the housing bubble of the 
early 2000s. Their analysis looks at the nation as a whole rather than at intra-city trends. 
However, their insight that investors (categorized as multiple lien holders) had a greater 
share of the mortgage market in states which experienced the greatest housing price in-
creases begins to use a spatial argument to show that investors played a key role in fueling 
price increases during the housing bubble (Haughwout et al. 2011).
Post-2008 Geographies of Speculation
A number of patterns with regard to the spatial distribution of investor owned proper-
ties and the demographic makeup of the areas they fall within have emerged in studies from 
metropolitan areas around the United States. Many of these are remarkably similar across 
geographies – such as investor activity being concentrated in lower income areas. However, 
there are also key differences between cities, as well as across different time periods.
Molina (2016) investigates investor purchases of foreclosed homes in post-housing 
crisis Los Angeles. Using a multilevel logistic regression Molina finds that investment was 
markedly different in neighborhoods with different racial compositions, and socioeconom-
ic profiles. Specifically, Molina sought to discern the presence of ‘flipping’ behavior, and 
whether it was evenly distributed in different kinds of urban areas. She found that own-
er-occupiers were more likely to purchase REO properties in the exurbs, on the outskirts of 
Los Angeles, while investors were more likely to purchase REO properties in the urban and 
inner-ring suburban communities. As well she found that investors were more likely to flip 
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properties in the inner-run suburbs and urban core than ones in the exurbs. She found that 
33% of investor-purchased REO properties were flipped during her study period and these 
were more likely to be located in tracts with lower household incomes and “much larger” 
non-white populations (Molina 2016, 571).
Immergluck and Law (2014) comparing 2010-2011 and 2008-2009 in Atlanta, GA found 
that at the end of 2011 concentrations of investor-owned properties was highest in ar-
eas with the highest poverty and vacancy rates. They found that “small” investors (those 
who purchased fewer than 10 REO properties between 2002-2011) made up the majority 
of purchases (89%) in tracts with below average percentage of investor purchases. Where-
as small investors only accounted for 50% of purchases in tracts with the highest rates of 
investor-ownership (Immergluck and Law 2014b). Ingrid Gould Ellen and colleagues (2015) 
authored a comparative study focused on Atlanta, Miami and New York City. They found that 
low income and distressed areas were more likely to be areas with high number of investor 
purchases. They found as well that this persisted but was less pronounced and shifted over 
the course of the foreclosure crisis with a greater number of investors purchasing properties 
in middle income areas (Ellen, Madar, and Weselcouch 2015).
 Research on nationwide trends from a leading aggregator of real estate sales data, 
CoreLogic, shows that the share of homes purchased by investors has continued to rise 
since the subprime crisis. Focusing on trends in the type of homes purchased they find 
that, in 2018, for homes in the bottom third of their local market investors purchased one in 
every five (Ralph 2019). The New York Times investigated these dynamics in Atlanta, Georgia 
chronicling the strain this has put on would-be homeowners looking for places to live in this 
formerly affordable neighborhood. As well they highlight a number of new tech-ventures 
(such as Entera) which aim to make purchasing single-family homes easier for out of town or 
smaller investors (Casselman and Dougherty 2019b). Further work is needed to investigate 
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these present-day dynamics in relation to patterns of investor ownership through the sub-
prime mortgage crisis and its aftermath.
Neighborhood Impacts of Investor Ownership
Scholars discuss a number of different impacts from investor ownership. They discuss 
varied impacts from different kinds of investor activity, as well as secondary impacts on 
renters.
Been and Glashausser (2009) speak about the secondary impacts that investor owner 
foreclosures during the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis had on renters – leading 
to widespread evictions and predatory practices by purchasers of the foreclosed properties. 
In many states tenants are not protected cases where the owners of their building face fore-
closure on the property (Been and Glashausser 2009). Aside from Section 8 voucher holders 
in most states a “first in time, first in right” framework governs the priority of liens on a prop-
erty. This means that whichever lien (lease or mortgage) came first is the one that is priori-
tized. Given that in the majority of cases landlords enter into a mortgage on their property at 
the time of sale, and only afterwards assign leases to the property this in effect means that 
for most tenants should their landlord enter into foreclosure their lease would no longer be 
valid (Been and Glashausser 2009).
Studying Chelsea, Massachusetts Fisher and Hansen (2012) compared rates of turn-
over, foreclosure and levels of investment between owner-occupiers and investors between 
1998-2010. Their work is motivated by a framework around neighborhood ‘stability’ and as 
such focus on assessing the benefits or risks to neighborhoods posed by investors. They find 
that local investors were 1.8 times more likely to experience foreclosure than owner-occu-
piers were. But that local investors also invested (measured through building permits) more 
heavily in relation to purchase price than did owner-occupiers. They conclude that investors 
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can produce to greater levels short-term investment but longer term volatility in neighbor-
hoods (Fisher and Lambie-Hanson 2012). Immergluck and Law (2014) call for further work on 
the effects of investor activity on local communities and suggest that research on longitudi-
nal trends in neighborhood demographics and change is needed for areas where there has 
been lots of investor activity (Immergluck and Law 2014a).
Describing the new forms of investment in foreclosed properties during the recent 
housing market recovery Mallach (2010) is widely cited for articulating four types of inves-
tor activities: holding, rehabbing, flipping and milking. Each has its own particular effects 
and has been traced out in various locations. According to Mallach, holding describes in-
vestors who purchase properties to maintain as rental housing. Milking refers to investors 
who purchase low cost properties in poor condition and rent them out with little to no im-
provement or maintenance. Rehabbing can have the impact of contributing to neighborhood 
improvement, as investors purchase dilapidated housing stock and then rehab to resell in 
good condition. Flipping is similar with rehabbing though without any improvements to the 
housing stock investors aim to quickly turn a profit by holding property briefly and mini-
mizing improvements. Flipping can contribute to rising housing prices and produce market 
volatility. Across multiple articles, particular focus has been paid in the literature to practic-
es of flipping and there is broad consensus on the negative impacts of flipping practices on 
communities.
Investor Financing Mechanisms: Impacts on Communities and Research
The mode of payment used by investors, whether financed or cash, is also widely 
discussed in the literature. Molina finds that 54% of investors in 2008 – 2009 used cash 
(compared with 29% of owner-occupants) noting the significant structural advantage that 
this typically gives buyers in the market. Other studies focus on the role that investors using 
17
mortgages may have played in exacerbating the subprime mortgage crisis. Haughwout et 
al. argue that investors were especially eager to take advantage of the increased liquidity 
made available by relaxed mortgage lending requirements in the lead up to the subprime 
crisis. Studying data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel they 
find that investors (who at the peak made up nearly half of all buyers in the states with the 
largest housing price increases during this period) drove up real estate debt, took on riskier 
mortgages, and significantly contributed to the “rapid deleveraging and delinquency that 
accompanied the bust” (Haughwout et al. 2011, 32).
In research on Las Vegas in 2009-2011 Mallach (2014) similarly points to high amounts 
of investor purchases made with cash. Using data from Campbell/Inside Mortgage Finance 
HousingPulse, Mallach notes that 77% of investor home purchases made were all cash. He 
highlights that this is concerning from a monitoring standpoint and show that only 15% of 
investor purchases are likely to be visible in HMDA. This figure is even lower than the all cash 
purchases when due to factoring in investor financing which comes from sources which 
would not be subject to HMDA reporting requirements (i.e. non FHA, Fannie Mae/Freddie 
Mac or VA mortgages) (Mallach 2014).
There are two key issues at play here. Whether investor-owners are contributing to un-
stable mortgage markets through risky borrowing. And conversely whether cash purchases 
by investor buyers are making it more difficult for other buyers who intend to become own-
er-occupiers to compete for homes.
Studying Investors: Data Sources and Methods
A number of different methodological approaches have been used in the literature. The 
vast majority use non-spatial statistical methods. Studies have used a number of different 
approaches to categorizing which purchases were made by investors.
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Rosenblatt and Sacco use data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) as 
their source. They categorized borrowers who report that they will not occupy their property 
as investors. They use GIS methods to study the geography of subprime vs prime investor 
lending over the decade. Specifically, they use the global and then local Moran’s I statistic to 
“test the degree to which each census tract is surrounded by similar concentrations of prime 
or subprime investor lending, respectively” (Rosenblatt and Sacco 2018, 99). Of note: their 
study uses density of investor loans per census tract (which does not appear to be a weight-
ed density).
Others cite a significant number of cash transactions (especially when purchasing REO 
properties after the subprime mortgage crisis) as well as widespread misreporting of occu-
pancy intentions in mortgage applications and thus avoid using HMDA data. Instead, a num-
ber of other studies use deed or sales level data either from municipal governments directly 
or from private aggregators (CoreLogic, DataQuick, Warren Group).
Definitions of ‘investor’ were also varied. Some studies relied on self-reporting of 
occupancy by loan applicants (Rosenblatt and Sacco 2018). Among those using sales data 
other methods were used. Molina (2016) using data on sales of foreclosed properties cod-
ed transactions to be investor purchases when the buyer field contained "corporation" or 
"LLC" or if the home was purchased by a buyer who made more than two purchases during 
the two years of her study. Fisher and Hanson use owner’s addresses from local tax records 
as the indicator of tenure, and code owners whose mailing address differs from the prop-
erty address as investors. Using a consumer credit survey Haughwout et al. use whether an 
individual carries multiple liens to categorize investors (Haughwout et al. 2011). Immergluck 
and Law have three criteria, similar to those used by Molina, that focus on the name of the 
purchaser, whether the name matches two or more purchases during their study period, and 
then whether the REO purchaser sells the property within twelve months (Immergluck and 
Law 2014a).
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III. Sites and Methods
Philadelphia, A Site for Research
There are a number of factors that make Philadelphia a fruitful site to examine spatial 
patterns of investor activity in residential real estate. It is a city of homeowners. Until 2017 
more Philadelphians owned homes than rented. It was particularly hard hit by the foreclo-
sure crisis, and continues to have a higher percentage of foreclosures than the national 
average (Cherry 2018). Even as it remains one of the more affordable cities in the Northeast, 
measures of ‘affordability’ often miss high costs associated with fixing up and maintain-
ing the aging houses (Kramer 2018). Today Philadelphia is experiencing population growth, 
and rising real estate values (Blumgart 2019a). Yet at the same time, Philadelphia has a 
persistent issue with vacancy which was exacerbated by the foreclosure crisis. According 
to nation-wide real estate sales data from CoreLogic (a for-profit aggregator of real estate 
data) the Philadelphia metro area has the second highest proportion of home purchases by 
non-occupant investors in the U.S. (Ralph 2019). By CoreLogic's methodology, which only 
considers purchasers with an LLC or other corporate name, twenty-three percent of the 
sales in Philadelphia in 2018 were made by non-occupant investors, compared with twen-
ty-seven percent in Detroit, MI. As I show later, if we include non-LLCs who have purchased 
multiple properties within a short time period this number is much higher.
Political Economic Context
Changes in the residential real estate market of Philadelphia in the late 1990s set the 
stage for private investment through the 2000s. Policy responses through the foreclosure 
crisis have had dual goals of supporting homeowners and turning over vacant foreclosed 
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properties to new private investors. This section lays out a brief account of the political and 
economic context of Philadelphia's housing markets during my study period.
Faced with disinvestment and abandonment in 1997 the City of Philadelphia intro-
duced a ten-year tax abatement in an attempt to spur new development (Ross 2018). The 
policy lowers real estate levies on buildings that are renovated or newly constructed. It 
allows developers to avoid paying taxes on any increased property value they create for ten 
years. Unlike programs in other cities Philadelphia's abatement program (which is still active 
today despite the 2000s building boom in the City) did not have any geographic restrictions. 
Often such programs are limited to construction and renovations in impoverished neighbor-
hoods, not so in Philadelphia. There have been calls to retire the abatement program since at 
least 2008.
The abatement is credited with setting off a development boom in Center City through 
its generous assistance to developers of large scale projects. For example, the $500 million 
Comcast Center was awarded a 95% reduction in taxes equivalent to savings of $4.6 million 
annually. The abatement also has had a large impact on encouraging investment and specu-
lation in impoverished city neighborhoods (Kerkstra 2008).
Some have welcomed the renovations and new development that came to areas like 
North Philadelphia after the abatement was introduced. These neighborhoods, long sites of 
disinvestment, began to see new waves of development in the early 2000s that brought large 
scale new construction projects as well as renovations and conversions of rowhouses into 
multifamily buildings (Young 2004). However, community advocates at the time raised con-
cerns about equity for the abatement in general and in particular about its impact in these 
neighborhoods. In a Philadelphia Inquirer article from 2004 the president of the Francisville 
Community Development Corporation (CDC) is quoted as saying "mixed income is good, but 
you can't let it get to the point where one forces the other out...The unfairness is that the 
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new people don't pay taxes for ten years and the old people keep paying tax increases they 
bring" (Unavee Bruce in Young 2004).
In tandem with the abatement program the City has worked through the Redevelop-
ment Authority and later the Philadelphia Land Bank, to dispose of thousands of city-owned 
vacant or delinquent parcels. In hopes of remediating 'blight' from neighborhoods this 
program aims to transfer these properties to developers or would-be homeowners, a smaller 
portion are made available to become community gardens or other community assets. The 
land bank was created in response to the growing number of delinquent or vacant proper-
ties in the aftermath of the foreclosure crisis, and in response to pressure to speed up the 
process for acquiring and disposing of delinquent parcels from investors (Young 2000; HUD 
Office of Policy Development and Research 2009).
Amidst programs geared towards revitalizing areas impacted by disinvestment a num-
ber of programs have also been designed to assist homeowners and low income residents 
who face housing insecurity. Philadelphia was particularly hard hit by the foreclosure crisis. 
In response, in 2008 Philadelphia created the Residential Mortgage and Tax Foreclosure 
Prevention Program to assist directly with the impacts of the financial crisis. This program 
provides free housing counseling and legal advice to homeowners who have been notified of 
mortgage or tax foreclosure and since 2008 has saved 13,000 households from foreclosure. 
More recently the city has launched a program with a similar model of mediation and coun-
seling aimed at assisting households facing eviction (City of Philadelphia 2018).
In October 2018 Philadelphia released its first ever housing action plan. The plan aims 
to address the varied housing needs of Philadelphians, with goals to preserve and produce 
affordable, middle-income, and market-rate housing. The report is responding to pressures 
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in housing availability: the city’s population has increased by nearly 80,000 since 2000 (or 
nearly six percent); between 2008 and 2016 nearly 13,000 lower-cost rental units (those 
renting below $800/month) were lost, while 6,000 high end rental units (above  $2,000/
month) were added during that same period; in 2016 there were 125,000 renter and home-
owner households who were severely cost burdened by their housing, which amounts to 
approximately thirty percent of all households in Philadelphia (City of Philadelphia 2018).
The report has a number of different policy recommendations that aim to help produce 
36,500 new housing units (both renter and owner-occupied) and help to preserve 63,500 af-
fordable and workforce housing units over the next ten years. It identifies repair costs, rising 
property taxes for long-term owners, and tangled titles which preclude access to public pro-
grams as some of the key challenges facing owner-occupants. Down payment, closing costs 
and realty transfer taxes are the major hurdles they identify for first-time and low-income 
homebuyers.
In the midst of these active efforts to plan for Philadelphia’s housing, understanding 
the present role of investment can help housing advocacy groups to ensure that policies 
fairly benefit Philadelphians. This is especially true in relation to the disposition of vacant 
and city owned land.
Investors in small residential properties (typically one to three unit buildings, often 
rowhouses) in Philadelphia come in a number of forms. Based on local news reporting during 
my study period it is possible to name four main groups of investors: local small time devel-
opers, out-of-towners, new private equity, and predatory buyers. Though of course, these are 
not entirely distinct, or mutually exclusive categories. In addition a number of local develop-
ment companies have worked since the early 2000s on buying, rehabbing and renting or sell-
ing rowhouses and single-family properties in the city (among these are Shift Capital, Philly 
Office Retail, and Reinvestment Fund). Several local Community Development Corporations 
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are also involved with this work. In what follows I summarize key practices from these differ-
ent groups, as they have been reported on, to contextualize the kinds of investment that is 
ongoing in Philadelphia.
Chartered Buses Bring Investors
In the midst of the early 2000s housing boom turned bubble, investors from around the 
North East (especially New York City) began to see Philadelphia as a smart place to estab-
lish equity in real estate. Small-scale out of town investors began to purchase properties in 
the city in visibly large numbers. A Philadelphia Daily News article from 2005 describes: 
At 8 A.M. on a recent Saturday, 40 people boarded a chartered bus leaving mid-town 
Manhattan in search of financial independence on the mean streets of Philadelphia...
Many of these economic freedom riders are New Yorkers, but at least one hails from 
Australia and another drove all the way from Chicago. Both came especially for the day 
trip arranged by New York City Cash Flow. (Young 2005b)
The day trip organizer, New York City Cash Flow, mentioned here was a kind of 'buyers-club': 
a membership based organization that arranged for trips and helped facilitate partnerships 
between interested small investors. In addition, reporting from the time describes large 
numbers of cars parked in neighborhoods in North Philadelphia with out of state license 
plates (Young 2005a). Neighbors described eager investors scouring neighborhoods in pur-
suit of "For Sale" signs, and in some cases even making cash offers to homeowners not 
planning to sell. Hopeful first-time buyers were often thwarted by investors willing to pay 
above the asking price. In an article from 2004 John, a veteran with a guaranteed VA mort-
gage was reported: "every time we found something we wanted, we were told that we'd been 
outbid" (Heavens 2004).
Early Private Equity in Single-Family Rentals
Philadelphia's row homes also appear to have been a central focus point for one of the 
first private equity firms investing in single-family rental properties – a trend we've now 
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seen expand exponentially following the foreclosure crisis (Fields 2018). In 2005, Redbrick 
Partners LP began buying rowhouses by the hundreds in Philadelphia. It was cited as "the 
only U.S. investment fund dedicated to single-family housing" at the time and aimed to 
give investors the opportunity to "join the gold rush without the ordeals of being a landlord" 
(Shell 2005; Hagerty 2005). The fund leveraged several million dollars in initial funding to 
purchase properties in Philadelphia and Baltimore and had developed methods for manag-
ing a large inventory of stand alone rental properties (at a profit) before other private equity 
firms felt comfortable venturing into this new terrain. Reporting from the time signals that 
representatives from Redbrick Partners would also often approach owners of houses not on 
the market with cash offers for homes in desirable neighborhoods.
"We Buy Houses" "Cash Offers Fast Closing"
Finally Philadelphia has also seen (and continues to see) a sizable amount of overtly 
predatory investors in rowhouses and other small residential properties. Illegal signs adver-
tising "We Buy Houses" are visible across Philadelphia. Typically they list a phone number 
and promises of cash for houses (see figure 4).
A few notorious investors, such as Robert N. Coyle, have made names for themselves 
by making cash offers to low income residents (often in dire situations) in neighborhoods 
in North Philadelphia.2 Coyle, a native of Philadelphia's Kensington neighborhood, was 
described by reporters as having "a knack for ingratiating himself to the grown children of 
Port Richmond's sick and dying" (Ruderman and Laker 2009). Reportedly he would approach 
vulnerable residents with offers to pay them in cash for their homes to help them escape 
debt, illness, family loss. Through a host of shady, unethical, and illegal activities Coyle 
2 See figure five for a context map of the city's neighborhoods.
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Figure 4. “We Buy Houses” signs visible in North Philadelphia. Images, Google Streetview 2019.
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would re-purpose homes into rental properties. He even allegedly forged housing inspection 
licenses allowing him to rent properties that would have been deemed uninhabitable. A local 
legislator remarked: "he was running a real-estate pawn shop" (Ruderman and Laker 2009). 
Long time residents credit him with the downturn of the neighborhood, albeit with overtly 
NIMBY overtones about the kinds of renters that Coyle's houses brought to their area.
Coyle's is among many similar schemes to profit off of low income homeowners. A 
more common approach often involves investors who make low all-cash offers to long-time 
residents or heirs of deceased property owners and then very quickly afterwards resell the 
properties at their market value. Often these homes are resold for ten to fifteen times the 
price the investors paid for them. A recent article summarizes this dynamic starkly: 
Harry and Lorraine Norris thought they were lucky when a stranger called with surpris-
ing news: Lorraine stood to inherit two lots in North Philadelphia, and some real estate 
investors wanted to buy them. The Norrises pocketed $14,000 from the deal. The team 
that bought the land did better. Four days after paying the Norris family, speculators 
Bryheim Murray and Kyle Easley resold the lots - for $144,000." (Adelman and McCoy 
2019)
This particular pair, Murray and Easley, have been operating in a legal grey zone in collabora-
tion with a estate administrator to purchase hundreds of properties in the city since 2014.
Thus we see that there are a range of methods at work by investors in Philadelphia. 
These overtly predatory, and often illegal tactics, while disturbing and problematic are not 
so different from the other methods used by private equity and out of town investors. Across 
these different kinds of investors we see that Philadelphia has been ripe for speculation at 
the expense of low income homeowners. This is not universal, certainly this influx of pri-
vate investment has also brought support and renewal to neighborhoods long rampaged by 
vacancy, tax delinquency, and disinvestment. However, recent reporting has uncovered the 
ways in which renewal through speculation has at times come at a cost for residents.
Delinquent Investors
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In 2013 The Philadelphia Inquirer conducted an analysis of city records for tax delin-
quency and made some interesting discoveries: "of the roughly 100,000 tax-delinquent prop-
erties in Philadelphia, at least 57,500 are owned by investors, not occupants." Likewise the 
total dollar amount owed by investors is much higher than owner-occupants: at least $316 
million by investors compared with $200 million for owner-occupants (Kerkstra 2013).
In this way investor delinquency is contributing to blight, reduced city budgets even 
as it is being encouraged (and incentivized through tax abatements) as a solution to those 
very problems. Research by The Inquirer revealed that many of these properties (11,000) are 
owned by investors with a non-Philadelphia address, and that a third of delinquent proper-
ties were owned by a company or individual who owns multiple delinquent properties. These 
tax delinquent properties are only a portion of the total properties owned as investments in 
the city, but nevertheless point to important considerations for policy makers in regulating a 
new landscape of real estate players.
Other recent activism has sprung up around the issues faced by tenants whose land-
lords operate under limited liability corporations (LLCs) or other kinds of companies. These 
landlords are currently not required to disclose names of principal holders or their address 
in rental permit applications. As a result there have been growing issues around tenants who 
have not been able to get recourse against absentee landlords for delayed repairs or code 
violations. In 2018 a bill was introduced in City Council to require the disclosure of all owners 
affiliated with LLCs or other corporate holding companies of rental properties. The bill which 
passed in late 2018 requires "property owners with at least a 24 percent share in a property 
to provide their names and mailing addresses when applying for a residential or commercial 
rental license" (Terruso 2018).
Methods
Against this backdrop, in this study I used a mixed methods approach to investigate the 
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spatial patterns in investor purchases in Philadelphia, and to learn about how this activity 
has been perceived by the community development sphere in the city. I analyzed publicly 
available data on real estate tax transfers and land use from the City of Philadelphia using 
GIS-based methods to discern spatial patterns in investor purchases. I conducted four semi 
structured interviews with representatives from community development corporations, 
community finance institutions, and non profit developers to contextualize the findings 
from this spatial analysis and to learn about the major challenges to affordable housing and 
housing access that they face in their work. I outline the methodology used for the GIS anal-
ysis and the interview methods in detail below.
Classifying Investors
To identify likely investor purchases I used data from the City of Philadelphia on record-
ed deeds (which are registered in order to assess real estate transfer taxes) for the years 
2000-2018. This study period allowed me to map out changes in investor patterns over the 
course of the housing bubble, crash and subsequent recovery, and also represents all years 
for which complete data is available in electronic format from the city.
My interest in this study is on small residential properties, i.e. single-family dwellings 
or buildings with few units, often single-family homes that have been converted into apart-
ments. The capital requirements for building and maintaining larger scale apartment build-
ings have long made them a focus for investors and real estate investment trusts. However 
widespread investor interest in owning single-family homes and small rental properties is 
a newer phenomenon (Fields 2018, 18). To limit the focus of the study to this type of small 
scale residential properties I used land use data also from the City of Philadelphia to select 
a subset of deeds within residential tax parcels. Deeds falling with 'Residential Medium 
Density' and 'Residential Low Density' parcels were selected for analysis. Residential low 
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density includes detached and semidetached single-family dwellings and the residential 
medium density category includes rowhouses (the most prevalent housing type in the city) 
as well as buildings with less than three floors and fewer than five units. Together these 
amount to just over 97 percent of all residential parcels in the city. The city's land used data 
set was released in 2019 however contains use designations established through neighbor-
hood surveys that began as early as 2012.
From this universe of deeds I classified deeds according to whether it was likely that 
the listed grantee was a non-occupant investor or an owner-occupier. Following the meth-
od used by Molina (2016), I used two criteria to classify deeds: those for which the grantee 
name contained LLC, Corporation or other legal entities in their name were classified as 
investor purchases, as were deeds for which the grantee made more than two purchases 
within any one-year period during my study.3
Discerning Spatial Patterns
To assess spatial patterns in investor and owner-occupant purchases, I first aggregat-
ed the classified deeds spatially to census blocks (which correspond to city blocks for the 
majority of Philadelphia). Given the time span covered by this study and to allow for compar-
ison with census data, I used 2000 census block definitions for study years 2000-2009, and 
the 2010 census blocks for 2010-2018.
From these aggregated results, I calculated the ratio of investor purchases to total 
residential parcels per block. This was calculated for each block, for each year. The same 
normalized measure was calculated for the owner-occupant purchases. This method follows 
from the methods used by Rosenblatt and Sacco (Rosenblatt and Sacco 2018). The ratio 
of investor purchases to total residential parcels shows the scale of the impact of investor 
3 The full list of corporate names considered was LLC, LP, Limited Partnership, Corpora-
tion, Corp, Inc, Company, Limited Partne, L P, L L C, Partnership, LTD, and Trust.
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purchases on the residential landscape of the block. The ratio of sales to total residential 
parcels is a measure which is calibrated to the experience of everyday life on that block. This 
is in contrast with a metric such as the percentage of annual sales for each block, which 
primarily highlights purchase activity in relation to the current state of a given real estate 
market. The ratio method used does however mean that blocks with a investor purchase ra-
tio of zero might be either be blocks with no investor purchases or blocks with no real estate 
transactions at all. As I will explain further below, this means that I focus on the blocks with 
high values for this purchase ratio in interpreting my results.
From these measures of the ratio of investor or owner-occupant purchases to residen-
tial parcels per block I used the global Moran's I statistic to test for global spatial autocor-
relation. The results of this analysis allow me to determine, for each year, whether investor 
or owner-occupier purchases (as a ratio of total residential parcels) by block are clustered, 
dispersed or randomly distributed across Philadelphia. This statistic is heavily influenced 
by the choice of a spatial weight which defines the degree to which each spatial unit (in this 
case, blocks) is related to or influenced by its neighbors. In this case, the spatial weight was 
defined as an inverse distance, with a search radius of one half mile. This means that for 
each block, all blocks within one half mile were be weighted equally and blocks further away 
than one half mile are weighted according to how far away they are from the block of inter-
est (the farther away the lower the degree of influence). I chose the distance threshold of 
one half-mile because it corresponds, roughly, to the area of many of Philadelphia's small-
er neighborhoods. Another factor that can influence results is the variability in size of the 
spatial unit being compared, in this case census blocks. Census blocks (and city blocks) in 
Philadelphia are largely uniform in area and shape.
Following this test, to determine where in Philadelphia there are clusters of values I 
used the local Moran’s I statistic. This statistic, calculated for each block, tests the extent 
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to which the rates of purchases in surrounding blocks are similar or different to a greater 
degree than would be expected by chance (Anselin 1995). The same spatial weight, inverse 
distance with a half-mile threshold, was used. The local Moran's I, tests both for similar 
clusters and for spatial outliers. Specifically, the results of the local Moran’s I identify four 
types of conditions: clusters of blocks with high ratios of purchases surrounded by others 
with similarly high-purchase ratios, spatial outliers of high ratios of purchases surrounded 
by blocks with low ratios of purchases, clusters of low ratios of purchases surrounded by 
other similarly low ratios of purchases, and spatial outliers of low ratios of purchases values 
surrounded by high ratios of purchases.
The results of the local Moran’s I on the investor and owner-occupier purchases for 
each year allowed me to compare between patterns of owner-occupier and investor pur-
chases, as well as to document shifts in the spatial concentrations of each over the course 
of the study period. In interpreting these results I focus primarily on the high-purchase clus-
ters, because, as mentioned above, low-purchase clusters could correspond either to areas 
with no sales at all or areas with few purchases by a given group.
Comparing Real Estate Geographies
To facilitate comparison between patterns of owner-occupant and investor purchases 
I focus on high-purchase clusters of each variable, following a method used by Rosenblatt 
and Sacco (Rosenblatt and Sacco 2018). I identified all blocks categorized as high-purchase 
clusters for investor purchases and owner-occupier purchases, respectively, for each year. 
For each year, I compared these results to see whether blocks overlapped – to see how many 
blocks were classified as high-purchase clusters for both investors and owner-occupiers. 
The results of this comparison allowed me to comment on the degree to which investor and 
owner-occupier activity had similar or different geographies for each year.
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To contextualize these differences I used census data to describe basic demographic 
characteristics of each of the geographies. I analyzed differences in race, median household 
income, poverty status, housing tenure, and vacancy at the census tract level (the smallest 
geography available for the variables of interest). All variables, with the exception of medi-
an household income, were expressed as a proportion of total tract population (i.e. percent 
white, percent households living below the poverty line etc). Given the duration of my study 
period I used demographic data from two moments in time: 2000 Decennial Census (Summa-
ry File 1, and 3), and the 2010 Decennial Census together with the 2012 American Community 
Survey (ACS) 5 Year Estimates. A full list of variables used is included in Appendix A.
To simplify interpretation of results I created demographic profiles for investor versus 
owner-occupant high-purchase clusters for multi-year increments: 2000-2006, 2007-2009 
and 2010-2013, and 2014-2018. These time periods correspond with major shifts in the 
housing market in Philadelphia that became visible through total purchase volume as well 
as spatial patterns in purchases. The middle period, 2007-2013 is divided into two demo-
graphic profiles as this set of years spans the transition to the 2010 Census and 2012 ACS.
For each of these multi-year periods I aggregated all blocks that were classified as be-
longing to a high-purchase cluster (for investor and owner-occupier purchases respectively), 
and through a spatial join selected all census tracts which contained them. Because all vari-
ables were expressed as proportions of total population, dasymetric mapping techniques 
were not used. These results were summarized in tabular form showing the mean (unweight-
ed) and standard deviations for each variable, as well as through violin plots to visualize the 
mean and distribution of each variable for owner-occupier and investor purchases.
Interviews
 In tandem with the GIS-based analysis described above I conducted four semi-struc-
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tured interviews with staff and leadership from community development corporations, non-
profit developers, and community finance institutions. These interviews gave me an oppor-
tunity to discuss preliminary findings with local practitioners engaged with issues around 
affordable housing in Philadelphia. As well they offered a view into the approach that local 
groups are taking to address housing needs in the city. A set of preliminary questions was 
developed that were asked of each interviewee, followed by questions specific to the work 
of each organization and follow up questions identified during the conversation (Immergluck 
and Law 2014b).
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IV. Findings and Discussion
This section discusses findings about the spatial patterns of investor purchases in 
Philadelphia together with current community responses and efforts around affordable 
housing. I look first at overall non-spatial trends in the purchase volume over the study peri-
od to contextualize the rest of the findings. I analyze spatial patterns in investor purchases 
for the city overall during three time periods, and then zoom in to three neighborhoods to 
interpret these patterns at a finer grained scale. Finally I summarize major themes from con-
versations with community development and community finance organizations in Philadel-
phia on the impacts and perceptions of this kind of investor activity.
Purchases Over Time
Analyzing the total number of residential deed filings reveals the broad contours of 
the housing bubble, housing market crash, and more recent recovery period. Figure 6 shows 
the total number of deed filings for parcels classified as medium or low density residential 
use, and highlights the deeds that were categorized as likely investor purchases. The chart 
suggests that the height of the housing bubble (in terms of total sales) was reached in Phil-
adelphia between 2004 and 2006, with a peak in 2005 of 34,731 total recorded deeds. The 
number of total sales sharply declined after 2006, falling to pre-2000 sales volume by 2008. 
The lowest number of deed transfers was reached in 2011 with nearly 20,000 fewer annual 
sales than in 2005. Beginning in 2012 the number of sales has steadily increased, and as of 
2018 has returned to a similar level of annual sales as was present in 2002.
The number of deeds transferred to likely investors (referred to in the deed filing as 
'grantee') appear to roughly mirror these overall trends with some greater variability. From 
these deed filings it appears that the highest volume of investor purchases took place in 
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2005, the lowest in 2011, and the volume has increased steadily since 2011.
Viewed as a percentage of total recorded deeds a slightly different story begins to 
emerge. Figure 6b shows likely investor purchases as a percentage of the overall number of 
deeds (i.e. purchases) from low and medium density residential parcels. From this we can 
see that the share of properties purchased by investors dropped after 2005, but has since in-
creased beyond 2005 levels. In 2000 likely investor purchases made up 27% of the total resi-
dential purchases in 2005 this was 37%, and in 2018 it has risen to nearly 40% (as discussed 
in the preceding methods chapter the universe of deeds, or sales, discussed throughout are 
deeds that are located on parcels classified as low and medium density residential use). 
Notably, highlighted in lighter orange on this chart, purchases by LLC or other incorporated 
entities has risen sharply since 2000 (from 7% of total sales in 2000 to nearly 28% in 2018), 
while investors purchasing multiple properties without an LLC or other entity has gone down 
over the same period.
Spatial Investments
The core research question that this project aims to tackle is: what are the spatial pat-
terns of likely non-occupant investor purchases in Philadelphia? To assess the geographic 
unevenness of investor and owner-occupant purchases, and determine whether any sig-
nificant clusters (or patterns of dispersion) exist for each of these two variables I used the 
global Moran's I statistic.
Following from the methods used by Rosenblatt and Sacco (2018), I aggregated pur-
chases to census blocks for each year and then calculated the ratio of investor purchases 
to the total residential parcels per block. The same was repeated for owner-occupant pur-
chases. This metric shows the scale of the impact of each type of purchase in relation to the 
residential landscape of the block.
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Figure 6a (top). Total residential deeds (grey), total likely-investor purchases (orange) by year. Purchases by 
LLCs and other corporate investors highlighted (light orange).
Figure 6b (bottom). Likely-investor purchases as a share of total purchases by year with purchases by LLCs 
and other corporate investors highlighted (light orange).
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Table 1 summarizes the global Moran's I results for the ratio of investor purchases 
to total residential parcels. For all years the value of the Moran I is positive, indicating the 
presence of clustering for all years, this is also referred to as positive spatial autocorrelation. 
Importantly these results are statistically significant for all years.
These results indicate that likely non-occupant investor purchases are spatially clus-
tered, and that it is highly unlikely that this spatial clustering is result of random chance. 
However these results do not yet tell us anything about the nature and location of this spa-
tial clustering in Philadelphia.
Local Patterns
Local Moran's I statistics allow us to see local patterns of spatial autocorrelation - in 
other words, the degree to which a particular area is surrounded by other areas with similar 
or different values. The local Moran's I was calculated separately for investor and owner-oc-
cupant purchases, for each year. Specifically the local Moran's I statistic allows us to see 
four types of spatial relationships and their statistical significance: (1) blocks with a high 
ratio of investor purchases relative to the total residential parcels on the block in proximi-
ty to blocks with similarly high ratios of purchases, (2) blocks with a low ratio of purchases 
in close proximity to blocks with a high ratio of purchases, (3) blocks with a high ratio of 
purchases in close proximity to blocks with low purchases, and (4) blocks with a low ratio 
of purchases surrounded by other blocks with a low ratio of purchases. The first type rep-
resents high-purchase clusters and will be our primary focus here. These indicate areas 
with an intensity of investor purchases. We will compare these with the same measures for 
owner-occupier purchases. As outlined in the methods chapter, here the spatial weight was 
defined as an inverse distance, with a search radius of a half-mile (corresponding roughly to 
the area of most Philadelphia neighborhoods).
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year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Moran’s I 
index
0.001504 0.01881 0.014071 0.019001 0.025942 0.026533 0.028611
p_sim 0.017 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Moran’s I 
index
0.030954 0.040487 0.01885 0.033167 0.021481 0.032823 0.039727
p_sim 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Moran’s I 
index
0.017054 0.023959 0.017734 0.025776 0.041598
p_sim 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Table 1. Global Moran’s I results for ratio of investor purchases to total residential parcels by block, by year
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Because the local Moran's I was calculated on the ratio of each type of purchases to 
the total number of residential parcels in each block the geographies of investor versus 
owner-occupier purchases mapped here are not simply the inverse of one another (as they 
would be if we mapped the proportion of each to total purchases in each block). Instead, 
the ratios show the impact that investor and owner-occupier purchase activity is having on 
the overall residential landscape and there is meaning in the differences between the two 
geographies. Areas of overlap between high-purchase clusters show us areas with high total 
real estate sales where both investors and owner-occupiers are active, and conversely areas 
with high-purchase clusters for investors and low-purchase clusters for owner-occupiers 
indicate areas where investors may be precluding purchases by would-be homeowners. 
Mapping the results of the local Moran's I analysis for each year at the citywide scale we can 
see a number of major patterns in how investor activity has been concentrated spatially over 
the course of the study period. In what follows I focus especially on high-purchase clusters 
as these help to discern key areas of focus for investors in Philadelphia.
Three Time Periods
The spatial patterns of investor purchases demarcate three broad time periods. These 
distinct changes in the spatial patterns of concentrated investor activity correspond roughly 
to the overall non-spatial housing market trends we saw in Figure 6. Between 2000 and 2006 
the number of high-purchase clusters increased, covering larger swaths of neighborhoods 
and moving into new neighborhoods. There are some year to year shifts at the neighborhood 
scale that we will examine in more detail, but an overall trend of expanding areas of focus for 
investor purchases is clear. Between 2007 and 2013 high-purchase clusters shrank, and the 
overall number of blocks within high-purchase clusters shrank significantly. Then between 
2014 and 2018 we see an increase in the number of blocks within high-purchase clusters. 
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Notably these high-purchase clusters expand into neighborhoods in the south and northeast 
of Philadelphia that were not seen in the 2000-2006 period.
These overall patterns suggest that investor areas of focus have shifted in Philadelphia 
between the housing bubble, foreclosure crisis, and subsequent market recovery. In the next 
section I examine these three periods in more detail.
2000 - 2006
At the beginning of my study period, in 2000, high-purchase clusters are visible in four 
main areas of the city. They cover parts of Frankford, Harrowgate, Richmond and Kensington 
in North Philly; parts of Hawthorne, Bella Visa and Queen Village in Central and South Philly; 
and much of Elmwood and Paschall in Lower Southwest Philadelphia. In 2001 these patterns 
largely remain the same. In 2002 however, high-purchase clusters in South Philly expand, 
new clusters appear in the Germantown area in Upper Northwest. In 2003 and 2004 con-
tinued expansion of high-purchase clusters in these areas is visible. In 2005 new high-pur-
chase clusters appear in Fairmount and North Central in Lower North Philadelphia and in 
Belmont in West Philadelphia. In 2006 clusters in these areas continued to expand outward 
covering greater portion of the city.
Figure 7 compares these geographies with concentrations of owner-occupier pur-
chases over the same period. This analysis reveals that investor purchases are spatially 
distinct from owner-occupier purchases. This suggests that investor purchases are not 
just one component of real estate markets in Philadelphia, but rather are driving their own 
sub-markets with a distinct geography. In 2000 areas of North Philadelphia are classified 
as investor high-purchase clusters correspond spatially with areas within owner-occupant 
low-purchase clusters. Across most years Upper Far Northeast, Central Northeast, and 
Lower Northeast host high-purchase clusters for owner-occupiers; while these same areas 
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are either areas with no significance for investor purchases or low-purchase clusters. Simi-
larly in 2005-2006 the investor high-purchase cluster in North and Lower North Philadelphia 
corresponds with a owner-occupier low-purchase cluster for the same years. In South Phil-
adelphia there are areas of overlap between investor and owner-occupant clusters, however 
investor high-purchase clusters cover a larger area and also are present in western portions 
of South Philly (Grays Ferry, Point Breeze) adjacent to the Schuykill River that fall within 
low-purchase clusters for owner-occupant purchases.
This is underscored by comparing the demographic characteristics of investor 
high-purchase clusters and owner-occupier high-purchase clusters. Figure 8 also compares 
the distributions for race, income, poverty status, housing tenure, and vacancy status of the 
census tracts that high-high blocks fall within for owner-occupant versus investor purchas-
es. Table 2 in Appendix B shows the mean and standard deviation for each of these same 
variables across all years. We see that blocks within investor high-purchase clusters be-
tween 2000 and 2006, on average: were less white by a wide margin, had a higher proportion 
of households living below the federal poverty line, and had moderately higher levels of va-
cancy, and a higher proportion of renter households. The average median household income 
for investor high-purchase clusters was $28,000, compared with $39,000 for owner-occupier 
clusters.
2007 - 2013
Between 2006 and 2010 the number of blocks belonging to investor high-purchase 
clusters reduced sharply, as did their geographic reach. Over this period, new clusters ap-
pear in areas of West Philadelphia near Drexel University and University of Pennsylvania, 
while the cluster of investor purchases in the Germantown area disappears entirely.































































































































































































































































































































In 2012 this activity persists in blocks very near the Drexel and University of Pennsylvania 
campuses but not in areas further west. By 2013 we see the fewest blocks in high-purchase 
clusters (and the largest land area with non-significant levels of spatial clustering) which 
likely corresponds to the low levels of investor activity during this year. These are outlined in 
figure 9.
In terms of demographics, areas with concentrations of investor activity still – on av-
erage – were less white, had a higher proportion of households in poverty, and a moderately 
higher proportion of renter households and vacant housing units. A comparison of high-pur-
chase clusters and these demographics are visible in figure 10.
2014 - 2018
In 2014 high-purchase clusters reemerge in Germantown and expand from Kensington 
towards Frankford. In 2015 we see an expansion of high-purchase clusters in the South Phil-
adelphia neighborhoods of Lower Moyamensing and Whitman. In 2016 we see an expansion 
of high-purchase clusters in the Germantown area and West Philadelphia near the universi-
ties. Overall during this period we see an increase since 2010-2013 of the size of high-pur-
chase clusters. These changes are documented in figure 11.
It is noteworthy that the areas of high levels of investor activity are concentrated 
around Germantown and in West Philadelphia in patterns that are distinct from those pres-
ent during the 2000-2006 period. This suggests that investor activity has morphed from its 
geographic focus during the housing bubble, and has expanded into new areas in Philadel-
phia. At the same time the investor high-purchase cluster covering most of North Philadel-
phia suggests that the expansion of investor activity into this area in 2006 helped to bring 
about a change in this area which has been reinforced in recent years.




























































































































































































































































































































high-purchase clusters of owner-occupiers during this period (see figure 12). The differences 
between the two are further highlighted through differences in the demographics associated 
with these areas. These were consistent with the two previous time periods: concentrations 
of investor activity occurred in areas where a higher proportion of households live in poverty, 
a higher proportion of black residents, and a greater proportion of households are renters.
Changing Neighborhoods
Citywide patterns of investor activity help to describe three distinct geographic pat-
terns corresponding to major periods of flux in housing markets over the course of this 
study. Looking more closely at three neighborhood areas, by zooming in to the analysis above, 
allows for a more detailed interpretation of local patterns. In what follows I trace out key 
patterns in North Philadelphia, West Philadelphia, and North West Philadelphia (especially 
Germantown).
North Philadelphia
The areas around Kensington in North Philadelphia were among those that had the 
most consistent presence high value clusters of investor activity. During each year examined 
in this study, some portion of East and/or Lower Kensington was in a block classified as a 
high value cluster.
Viewing the local Moran's I results at the neighborhood scale (mapped in figure 13) 
makes visible the ways in which even within areas with an abundance of blocks within high 
value clusters of investor activity there is a large degree of variability between blocks, re-
sulting in an abundance of spatial outliers. In areas with high-high blocks, there are often 
surrounding blocks with a statistically significant low ratio of purchases by investors. Like-
wise in areas with an abundance of low-purchase clusters (dark blue), there are interspersed 






































































































































































































































































































































Between 2000 and 2004 in the North Philadelphia area there were two distinct spa-
tial patterns. The western areas of Kensington, Harrowgate and Port Richmond formed a 
high-purchase cluster; and the areas including North Philadelphia West, Glenwood, Tioga, 
Franklinville, and Hartranft formed a low-purchase cluster. In 2005-2006 however, at the 
height of buying during the housing boom in Philadelphia, this pattern shifts. In 2005 areas 
of North Philadelphia West became a high-purchase cluster, while a low-purchase cluster 
remained in Hartranft, Glenwood, Fairhill (these areas are highlighted in yellow on figure 13). 
However in 2006 this is replace by a high-purchase cluster in Tioga, Franklinville.
For the remainder of the study period concentrations of investor activity remained in 
these western areas of North Philadelphia (albeit with drops in the total number of clusters 
consistent with an overall drop in purchase activity between 2010-2013). Indeed between 
2014-2018 the high-purchase cluster expanded steadily in geographic area. Notably many 
of these areas are part of a low-purchase cluster of owner-occupant purchases pointing to 
this as an area primarily being targeted by investors (as opposed to a 'hot' real estate market 
more generally). The implications of this are multiple, they point to geographically distinct 
speculation-driven real estate activity, they might also point to a market where it is difficult 
for would-be owner-occupants to participate.
In interviews with staff from Philadelphia community development corporations and 
community finance institutions, one factor cited for the prevalence of investors in the areas 
with Philadelphia's most affordable housing stock is a lack of mortgage financing avail-
able to would-be homeowners. With home prices of around $50,000 in some neighborhoods 
banks do not make small enough mortgages available and thus investors are the only ones 
who can purchase these homes. One interviewee cited not-yet published research that less 

































Local Moran’s I, North Philadelphia
Local Moran’s I for ratio of 
investor purchases to 
residential parcels by block
Figure 13.
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The real estate transfer tax data set used for analysis in this study does not include 
information on whether transactions were made with cash or some kind of bank financing. 
However, with home prices as low as $30,000 to $80,000 in these areas it is often hard to ob-
tain traditional bank loans and so it is reasonable to assume that there is a high percentage 
of cash purchases.
West Philadelphia
Figure 14 show that for West Philadelphia there are no discernible patterns in the 
2000-2005 period. No statistically significant clusters were present in 2000-2003. Beginning 
in 2006 however a cluster of high ratio of investor purchases emerges in the areas to the 
northwest of University City. In 2008/2009 another high-purchase cluster emerges in the 
area around Cobbs Creek and Haddington. The Haddington cluster was not present in 2010, 
2012, or 2013. However beginning in 2014 clusters in both neighborhoods expand outward 
each year. This expansion resulted in a large high-purchase cluster in 2018 surrounding the 
areas occupied by Drexel University and University of Pennsylvania. Notably, throughout the 
study period these areas were sites of low-purchase clusters for likely owner-occupant pur-
chases. Pointing to an investor-driven residential real estate market in West Philadelphia.
Based on analysis of permit data, the Philadelphia Association of Community Devel-
opment Corporations cited in interviews that new student housing has been one of the key 
components of overall construction in Philly in the last decade: "around the Universities we 
have seen a huge amount of new student housing." It is likely that a significant proportion of 
the investor purchases in this area. According to PACDC this type of development has been 
controversial "neighbors don't like that at all. They have complained about their neighbor-
hoods being overrun by students who are there temporarily and are not really invested in 
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would imagine would come along with that" (interview transcript 2020).
Germantown
The first high-purchase clusters for the Germantown area appear in 2002, in the Ger-
mantown-Morton and Southwest Germantown areas. These clusters shift in geography 
somewhat in subsequent years, and in 2006 the number of blocks in high-purchase clusters 
grows. Maps for Germantown in all years are shown in figure 15.
During the downturn from 2008-2013 few clusters are visible in these Upper Northwest 
Philadelphia neighborhoods. However beginning in 2014 there is a steady increase in the 
number of blocks within high-purchase clusters in the neighborhood.
Interestingly, throughout the study period the investor high-purchase clusters often 
correspond with low-purchase clusters for owner-occupant purchases for the same year 
(see figure 16). In general investors focused in the southern and eastern portion of the area, 
and in East Mount Airy. Whereas owner-occupier purchases were concentrated in the west-
ern and northern areas such as West Mount Airy. If we had compared investor and own-
er-occupant purchases as a percentage of total sales we would expect this kind of inverse 
relationship: areas of high concentration of investor purchases would directly correspond 
with areas with a low concentration of owner-occupant purchases. However, here because 
we have instead compared the ratio of investors or owner-occupant purchases to the total 
number of residential parcels these inverse relationships, when they appear, are significant. 
The relationship here in Germantown signals that there is a dual housing market in Phila-
delphia with geographic divisions between investors and owner-occupiers. This suggests 
that East Mount Airy, and other neighborhoods like it are primarily sites for outside invest-
ment and rent extraction or real estate speculation, and not areas which are seeing internal 
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low-income households, it is likely that many of these properties are being sold by long time 
homeowners or their children. The neighborhood impacts of these transformations are likely 
to be profound.
In recent years, through the Jumpstart Germantown program, this area has been a test 
bed for a new model of locally-driven real estate investment. This program (whose leader-
ship was interviewed for this study) highlights complex relationships between disinvestment 
and new forms of speculation in Philadelphia. In what follows I discuss this program and 
other ongoing efforts by community development organizations.
(Equitable) Development
In interviews conducted among the community development and community finance 
institutions as part of this study the core focus was on issues around equitable develop-
ment. As the preceding spatial analysis has made clear there have been clear geographies of 
focus by investors in single-family homes and residential properties with just a few apart-
ments. Philadelphia during this period has been faced with the issues of vacancy, persistent 
tax delinquency, and foreclosure at precisely the same time as it has seen a steady increase 
in private investment in homes. Community responses often grapple with the contradictions 
created by both of these issues.
Changing the Actors in Development
Jumpstart Germantown was launched in 2015 providing workshops and mentorship 
to would-be developers who are from, or have some kind of connection to, the Germantown 
area. The organization aims principally at "removing blight, keeping gentrification at bay, and 
having wealth go back to folks in the neighborhood" (Interview, February 24, 2020).
In its first five years Jumpstart has had 755 participants in their twelve hour course. 
Fifty percent of those participants are from the Germantown area. And the remaining fifty 
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percent have some other connection to the neighborhood – they grew up in Germantown, 
have family there, work in the neighborhood, or went to high school there. A majority of 
'Jumpstarters' are women of color. Through a grant from the Vera Foundation the organiza-
tion produced open source versions of all of their instructional materials as well as guides 
aimed at other organizations interested in starting their own Jumpstart program. As a result 
satellite programs have emerged in six other neighborhoods in Philadelphia that have built 
their own programs and curriculum based on the Jumpstart model and are often affiliated 
with a local CDC. These programs are fully independent of Jumpstart though they draw heav-
ily on their curriculum.
Innovative Financing Mechanisms to Compete with Cash Buyers
Soon after launching their program in 2015 Jumpstart's founders realized that the ma-
jor hurdle their 'graduates' were facing was having access capital to cover upfront purchase 
and construction costs. Traditional bank loans did not serve the needs of many of the would-
be investors, because the minimum loan amounts were too high, the process for securing a 
bank loan took too long, and new investors often did not have the needed collateral or credit 
scores. In response, Jumpstart's founder, Ken Weinstein, created a fund to provide small 
short-term loans to Jumpstart participants for projects in the Germantown area (the actu-
al area includes portions of a few adjoining neighborhoods and has changed slightly over 
the programs five years in response to changing markets and increased demand in certain 
areas). These loans require very few documents and Jumpstart Germantown is often able to 
close in less than a week. New investors seeking to develop rental properties are required to 
report their credit scores, however those who are intending to resell properties after reno-
vation are not. The loans are two years with a fixed interest rate of 7.25%, no payments are 
made during construction, and extensions are available for a fee. Many participants end up 
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needing to extend their loans past the initial two years in order to repay, but as of 2019 there 
have not been any foreclosures. In four years the fund has had $16 million in lending, and 151 
loans in the Germantown area (an average loan amount of a little over $100,000)
As new Jumpstart Programs have emerged in other neighborhoods in Philadelphia 
graduates of these programs have also encountered the challenges with upfront capital 
costs. Thus far no other programs have been able to start their own loan fund and so Jump-
start Germantown partnered with Philadelphia based community development financial 
institution (CDFI), Reinvestment Fund, to establish a new fund for these aspiring investors. 
This fund, Jumpstart Philly, uses similar terms as the existing Jumpstart Germantown pro-
gram, with the additional requirement that all properties must either be sold or rented at 
'affordable' prices defined according to HUD Area Median Incomes for Philadelphia County. 
For rentals the property must be affordable to a household with an income of 70% AMI and 
for resale it must be affordable to a household at 90% AMI. For reference for a household of 
three this would mean a household income of between $57,000 and $73,000 per year, rent for 
a two bedroom apartment of $1,420, and a total cost for a two bedroom house of $291,000.
Jumpstart Germantown, and its affiliated loan programs present a local response to 
the dual challenges of investment and disinvestment in Philadelphia today. On the one hand 
Jumpstart is a response to the presence of vacant and delinquent properties in the city - ev-
idence of years of under and disinvestment in Philadelphia, as well as of the ongoing fall out 
from the foreclosure crisis. And on the other its loan program is structured so that would-be 
local investors can compete with the ample cash buyers who are also working in the neigh-
borhood. Thus the program speaks to the volatility and contradictions of housing in contem-
porary Philadelphia, where many neighborhoods experience challenges with vacancy at the 




Other issues surrounding the fast pace of investment was reported on in interviews 
in relation to landlords of new rental properties. One interviewee echoed The Philadelphia 
Inquirer reporting stating that "busloads of people come to Philly from elsewhere especially 
New York, with lots of recent immigrants who have learned this is a good way to invest mon-
ey" (interview with author February 2020). An interviewee who had observed eviction court 
proceedings relayed that landlords were often ill-equipped and lacked rudimentary knowl-
edge during eviction proceedings. They cited that interpreters were often present in court for 
the landlords during eviction cases, and that in many instances landlords were not aware of 
basic regulations for rental properties and were often in violation of rules.
Policy to Profit from Development
Philadelphia's community development corporations and the Philadelphia Association 
of CDCs (PACDC) have been eager to solve the dual problems of remediating vacant lots and 
properties in disrepair while also supporting the constituencies with affordable housing 
options. PACDC has led the way on both of these issues calling for Equitable Development 
goals in the city at large and working with City Council on a number of measures designed to 
bolster Philadelphia's resources for affordable housing. Speaking about their vision for their 
work PACDC representative said:
We need to grow but we need to take some of the benefit of that and be really strategic, 
putting it back in neighborhoods. Equitable development is about building communities 
not just buildings. The city is flush with cash, because of all of this new activity, so lets 
get as much of this as we can and get it into the neighborhoods. (interview with author 
February 2020). 
These efforts have focused in particular on increasing funding to the city's Housing Trust 
Fund, and working towards inclusionary zoning. They have had successes in bringing in fund-
ing for the Trust Fund but not on inclusionary zoning.
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Alternative Models
In slightly different ways, many policies promoted by PACDC and Jumpstart German-
town, are squarely designed to encourage speculative forms of development in hopes of 
producing externalities that might support longtime residents or produce affordable housing. 
The Women's Community Revitalization Project, a CDC that has primarily focused on devel-
oping long term affordable housing in Philadelphia, has taken a different approach. In 2010 
together with a coalition of organizations in eastern north Philadelphia they founded the 
Community Justice Land Trust (CJLT). The trust acquires publicly-owned land and develops 
it into permanently affordable housing. The three projects in the Port Richmond, German-
town, and Point Breeze neighborhoods use a rent to own model and families sell properties 
back to the trust when they want to move for the base price they paid plus appreciated value. 
The trust then resells or rents properties at below market rates (Blumgart 2019b). The pro-
gram addresses many of the same issues as Jumpstart Germantown, rehabbing vacant and 
delinquent properties, providing more higher-quality housing in Philadelphia's more impov-
erished neighborhoods. However the model is radically different in that it preserves the long 
term affordability of the land it develops, privileging housing over profit.
The differences between these programs speak to the challenges faced by communi-
ty development and related organizations interested in the dual goals of renewed private 
investment in Philadelphia's neighborhoods and in ensuring that development happens in 
ways that are 'equitable.' They speak to the ways in which new widespread investment and 




This study has focused on the spatial patterns of investor purchases of residential 
properties in Philadelphia through the housing bubble, crash, and subsequent recovery. 
Through interviews it has begun to interrogate the ways in which local development corpora-
tions and community finance institutions have been working on the impacts of these chang-
es.
This research indicates that investor purchases have a distinct geography, different 
from that of purchases made by owner-occupiers. These differences vary across the city, in 
some neighborhoods, and for some years there are areas of overlap. However for the majori-
ty of the city, and even within neighborhoods, the areas visible as points of focus for investor 
purchases are spatially removed from areas with concentrations of owner-occupant pur-
chases. In many key instances areas with a high ratio of investor purchases to total residen-
tial properties correspond to areas where there is a low ratio of owner-occupant purchases. 
These differences in geography suggest that certain neighborhoods in Philly are currently 
primarily sites for outside investment (and thus either rent extraction or real estate specula-
tion) and not for sustainable affordable housing (or community wealth generation). Given the 
history of Philadelphia as a city of homeowners, even among low-income households, it is 
likely that many of these properties are being sold to investors by long time homeowners or 
their children. The neighborhood impacts of these transformations are likely to be profound.
The longitudinal nature of this study has revealed that certain city-wide patterns in in-
vestor activity first emerged during a spike in investor purchases during the housing bubble. 
These areas, especially in North and Lower North Philadelphia, first saw concentrations of 
above average levels of investor purchases during the peak of the housing market in 2006, 
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and have over the course of the recovery been cemented as areas with a high concentration 
of investor purchases. At the same time, other areas of the city have emerged as sites with 
a high degree of investor activity more recently. These locations reveal patterns which were 
not present in the first decade of the century signaling that investment is moving into new 
areas and expanding beyond the geographies established during the housing bubble.
The study has also showed that across these time periods, higher levels of investor 
purchases are associated with poorer neighborhoods, and with neighborhoods that have 
larger populations of color. Investor purchases occurred in areas with higher rates of renter 
households, however not overwhelmingly higher. This suggests that investors are not fo-
cused on neighborhoods already full of predominantly rental buildings, but rather on low 
income neighborhoods with both homeowners and renters. The demographic differences 
between these geographies suggest that Philadelphia's poorest residents and residents of 
color are disproportionately impacted by the increase of investor activity.
From news reporting on investors over this period we have also seen that Philadelphia 
was among the first sites for new interest on the part of real estate investment trusts and 
private equity in single-family rental properties during the housing bubble. In the years since 
we have seen this focus expand into an asset class, and explicitly supported by federal poli-
cy as a response to the foreclosure crisis (Fields 2018).
These new forms of investment have occurred in Philadelphia during a period in which 
the city began to see widespread new development for the first time in several decades. In 
response, community development organizations and finance institutions have largely been 
focused on how to channel new development towards funding for affordable housing and 
other programs. Other efforts have also focused on finding ways for longtime residents to 
benefit from increases in development potential, in some instances by training them to be-
come small-scale developers themselves.
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At the same time we see that investor-owned properties make up a disproportionate 
share of the city's tax delinquent properties (Kerkstra 2013). Strategies which encourage 
private investment have not always taken this into account. As well, people are beginning to 
speak out against the negative impacts that LLCs and the use of shell corporations by land-
lords can have on tenants. Tenants who do not know the name or address of their landlords 
are severely limited in their ability to prosecute landlords for code violations, delayed repairs, 
intimidation or other issues (Terruso 2018).
As an older city struggling with issues associated with a prolonged period of disinvest-
ment - such as persistent vacancy, tax delinquency, aging housing stock - an influx of private 
capital in whatever form is deeply alluring within our current economic frameworks. However 
paradoxically, these very same conditions (especially a large number of city owned parcels) 
puts the Philadelphia in a unique position to take on some of these issues in new ways not 
yoked to real estate speculation. However, as of yet, much policy has focused on encourag-
ing private development (at any cost) with a nearly twenty five year old tax abatement policy 
for new construction and renovations arguably well beyond its useful life.
Philadelphia presents a case in which it is clear that investment in real estate is tak-
ing on new forms and geographies, as we have seen in other cities (Molina 2016; August and 
Walks 2018; August 2020; Fields 2018; Mallach 2014). It is clear that this activity is impact-
ing the housing landscape in the city significantly. However the contours of these impacts 
are not yet clear. To more fully address these issues, further research is needed into what 
types of investors are acting in different geographies within the city, as well as on what uses 
investors are putting properties towards after purchasing them. Given the efforts by CDCs 
and others to develop affordable housing through rehabbing delinquent rowhouse proper-
ties, distinguishing between this activity and that of real estate speculators is an important 
next step in further understanding the impacts that investors are having on housing in Phil-
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adelphia. Thus future research should find out more about the different types of investors 
in Philadelphia and their actions, distinguishing between non-profit and for-profit groups, 
private equity, local-landlords, and house flippers. Further research on the uses of inves-
tor-owned properties is needed as well: how many homes are purchased and re-sold, versus 
held as rental properties? And do particular neighborhoods see more of one type of use than 
others. The sharp increase in the number of purchases being made through LLCs and other 
corporate entities prompts further questions about the uses of these properties, and the 
true ownership networks that can often be hidden by shell corporations. Given that land-
lords often hide persistent rental regulation violations by using individual LLCs for each of 
their properties, linking these LLCs to one another is an important tool for tenant organizing 
and advocacy.4 Another key issue that should be taken up in further research is the financing 
mechanisms used by investors. The real estate transfer tax data set used for analysis in this 
study does not include information on whether transactions were made with cash or some 
kind of bank financing. However there is much evidence that investors making purchases 
with cash often beat out would-be homeowners unable to secure mortgage financing for 
some of the lowest-cost homes in Philadelphia. Geographic variation in financing mecha-
nisms used by investors could help to discern geographies that pose barriers to access to 
homeownership for low-income residents. The perceptions of long-time residents to new-
comer investors was not explored in this study but would give powerful input for policy pro-
posals designed to address the dual issues of speculation and disinvestment in Philadelphia.
Policies like those which have begun to spring up in Philadelphia to protect tenants 
from delinquent landlords masked by LLCs mark important development for vulnerable ten-
ants. However, what would a housing market recovery or a solution to vacancy and disinvest-
4 The Anti-Eviction Mapping Project is a powerful example of this kind of activist work 
through data analysis and research into the ownership networks of mega-landlords in San 
Francisco, Los Angeles and New York City.
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ment that did not rely on speculative real estate investment look like?
My study suggests that currently investor practices divide Philadelphia into areas of 
speculation, rather than contributing to uniform revitalization in the city as a whole. This is 
not a surprising outcome of profit-driven development practices, but rather one of its nat-
ural and expected results. Investors flock to and dominate low end markets redeveloping 
homes in ways that seek to maximize returns on investment, often at the expense of build-
ing a just and equal housing landscape. Programs like the Community Justice Land Trust, 
managed by the Women's Community Revitalization Project, point towards other alternative 
models that delink housing and profit. The City of Philadelphia has a unique opportunity to 
prioritize and support these programs, and use the Philadelphia Land Bank to direct devel-
opment towards cooperative and land trust models rather than merely encouraging further 
speculation.
As I finish this draft in late April nearly all of the conditions in this analysis seem as 
if they will be entirely upended. COVID-19 – classified as a global pandemic by the World 
Health Organization in mid-March 2020 – has raced around the world. The number of job-
less claims in the U.S. alone has soared to the tens of millions, and in a matter of days far 
outstripped any level previously recorded. On housing, many cities and states have halted 
eviction proceedings. In Philadelphia all evictions by the Public Housing Authority have been 
halted, and most foreclosure proceedings have as well. However activist groups in Phila-
delphia and elsewhere have called for far more drastic measures, rent freezes and halts on 
mortgage payments. Meanwhile, pundits and the president are pitting the economy against 
human life in statements like "we can't have the cure be worse than the problem." It is hard 
to begin to imagine what any futures hold after this moment, even and especially in rela-
tion to housing and shelter. I am apprehensive, but also have profound hope, that we might 
dream together a more just world through this crisis.
71
Works Cited
Aalbers, Manuel. 2019. “Housing and Financialization.” In A Research Agenda for Housing., 




Adelman, Jacob, and Craig R. McCoy. 2019. “Lucrative Flips Exploit the Poor, Naive; Unregu-
lated Entrepreneurs Scour Poor, Gentrifying Neighborhoods for Real-Estate Heirs, Pay 
Them Low-Ball Prices, and Resell the Properties for Huge Profits.” The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, September, 7.
Anselin, Luc. 1995. “Local Indicators of Spatial Association—LISA.” Geographical Analysis 27 
(2): 93–115. doi:10.1111/j.1538-4632.1995.tb00338.x.
August, Martine. 2020. “The Financialization of Canadian Multi-Family Rental Housing: From 
Trailer to Tower.” Journal of Urban Affairs 0 (0): 1–23. doi:10.1080/07352166.2019.17058
46.
August, Martine, and Alan Walks. 2018. “Gentrification, Suburban Decline, and the Financial-
ization of Multi-Family Rental Housing: The Case of Toronto.” Geoforum 89 (February): 
124–36. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.04.011.
Been, Vicki, and Allegra Glashausser. 2009. “Tenants: Innocent Victims of the Nation’s Fore-
closure Crisis the Worst of Times: Perspectives on and Solutions for the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis.” Albany Government Law Review 2 (1): 1–28. https://heinonline.org/
HOL/P?h=hein.journals/aglr2&i=17.
Blumgart, Jake. 2019a. “Zoning the American Dream: Where Philly Fits in the Debate over 
Affordable Housing.” WHYY. NPR. https://whyy.org/episodes/zoning-the-american-
dream-phillys-debate-over-affordable-housing/.
———. 2019b. “Affordable Forever? A New Kind of Housing Comes to South Philadelphia.” 
WHYY, November. https://whyy.org/articles/affordable-forever-a-new-kind-of-housing-
comes-to-south-philadelphia/.
Casselman, Ben, and Conor Dougherty. 2019a. “Real Estate’s Latest Bid: Zillow Wants to Buy 
Your House.” The New York Times, May. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/busi-
ness/economy/ibuying-real-estate.html.
———. 2019b. “Want a House Like This? Prepare for a Bidding War with Investors - the 
New York Times.” The New York Times, June. https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2019/06/20/business/economy/starter-homes-investors.html.
Cherry, Elyse. 2018. “The Hidden Costs of Foreclosure: Stabilizing Low-Income Philadelphia 
Neighborhoods Helps Us All Opinion.” The Philadelphia Inquirer, July. https://www.
inquirer.com/philly/opinion/commentary/foreclosure-homes-philadelphia-neighbor-
hoods-20180709.html.
Christophers, Brett. 2015. “The Limits to Financialization:” Dialogues in Human Geography, 
July. doi:10.1177/2043820615588153.
City of Philadelphia. 2018. “Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia.”
Dezember, Ryan. 2019. “Blackstone Starts Selling Out of Home-Rental Empire.” Wall Street 
Journal, May. https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackstone-starts-selling-out-of-home-
rental-empire-11559152680.
Dezember, Ryan, and Corrie Driebusch. 2017. “Blackstone Group’s Invitation Homes Prices 
IPO at $20 a Share.” Wall Street Journal, January. https://www.wsj.com/articles/invita-
72
tion-homes-prices-ipo-at-20-a-share-1485901804.
Ellen, Ingrid Gould, Josiah Madar, and Mary Weselcouch. 2015. “The Foreclosure Crisis and 
Community Development: Exploring REO Dynamics in Hard-Hit Neighborhoods.” Hous-
ing Studies 30 (4): 535–59. doi:10.1080/02673037.2014.882496.
Fields, Desiree. 2017. “Unwilling Subjects of Financialization: UNWILLING SUBJECTS OF FI-
NANCIALIZATION.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 41 (4): 588–
603. doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12519.
———. 2018. “Constructing a New Asset Class: Property-Led Financial Accumulation After 
the Crisis.” Economic Geography 94 (2): 118–40. doi:10.1080/00130095.2017.1397492.
Fisher, Lynn M., and Lauren Lambie-Hanson. 2012. “Are Investors the Bad Guys? Tenure and 




Gilderbloom, John I., Joshua D. Ambrosius, Gregory D. Squires, Matthew J. Hanka, and Zacha-
ry E. Kenitzer. 2012. “Investors: The Missing Piece in the Foreclosure Racial Gap Debate.” 
Journal of Urban Affairs 34 (5): 559–82. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9906.2012.00619.x.
Hagerty, James R. 2005. “ENTREPRENEURS ARE BUYING UP HOMES BY THE HUNDREDS.” 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazett, September, 4.
Harvey, David. 1982. The Limits to Capital. Oxford: B. Blackwell.
Haughwout, Andrew F., Donghoon Lee, Joseph S. Tracy, and Wilbert van der Klaauw. 2011. 
“Real Estate Investors, the Leverage Cycle, and the Housing Market Crisis.” SSRN Elec-
tronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1926858.
Heavens, Alan J. 2004. “’Properly Priced’ Gets Complicated in Boom. Setting a Selling Price 
for a Home Is Part Art, Part Science and Math. Rapidly Rising Prices Muddy the Equa-
tion.” The Philadelphia Inquirer, January, 4.
HUD Office of Policy Development and Research. 2009. “Revitalizing Foreclosed Properties 
with Land Banks.” U.S. Department of Housing; Urban Development.
Immergluck, Dan, and Jonathan Law. 2014a. “Speculating in Crisis: The Intrametropolitan 
Geography of Investing in Foreclosed Homes in Atlanta.” Urban Geography 35 (1): 1–24. 
doi:10.1080/02723638.2013.858510.
———. 2014b. “Investing in Crisis: The Methods, Strategies, and Expectations of Investors in 
Single-Family Foreclosed Homes in Distressed Neighborhoods.” Housing Policy Debate 
24 (3): 568–93. doi:10.1080/10511482.2013.850733.
Kerkstra, Patrick. 2008. “Is Tax Windfall Worth the Wait?; Philadelphia’s Abatement Is to Pay 
Off Big - in 2021.” The Philadelphia Inquirer, December, 8.
———. 2013. “Playing with the City’s Tax Money.” The Philadelphia Inquirer, March, 6.
Kramer, Anna. 2018. “Old Homes, High Poverty Make Philadelphia Housing Less Than Afford-
able for Some.” WHYY. https://whyy.org/articles/old-homes-high-poverty-make-phila-
delphia-housing-less-than-affordable-for-some/.
Lambie-Hanson, Lauren, Christopher E. Herbert, Irene Lew, and Rocio Sanchez-Moyano. 
2015. “Foreclosed Property Investors in a Strong Housing Market City: A Case Study of 
Boston.” Cityscape 17 (2): 239–68. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326948.
Lane, Ben. 2019. “Blackstone Cashes Out on Invitation Homes.” HousingWire. https://www.
housingwire.com/articles/blackstone-cashes-out-on-invitation-homes/.
Mallach, Alan. 2010. “Meeting the Challenge of Distressed Property Investors in America’s 
Neighborhoods.” New York, NY: Local Initiatives Support.
———. 2014. “Lessons from Las Vegas: Housing Markets, Neighborhoods, and Distressed 
Single-Family Property Investors.” Housing Policy Debate 24 (4): 769–801. doi:10.1080/1
73
0511482.2013.872160.
Molina, Emily T. 2016. “Foreclosures, Investors, and Uneven Development During the Great 
Recession in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area.” Journal of Urban Affairs 38 (4): 564–
80. doi:10.1111/juaf.12258.
Ralph, McLaughlin. 2019. “Special Report: Investor Home Buying.” CoreLogic Insights Blog. 
https://www.corelogic.com/blog/2019/06/special-report-investor-home-buying.aspx.
Rolnik, Raquel. 2019. Urban Warfare : Housing Under the Empire of Finance. Brooklyn, NY: 
Verso.
Rosenblatt, Peter, and Steven J. Sacco. 2018. “Investors and the Geography of the Subprime 
Housing Crisis.” Housing Policy Debate 28 (1): 94–116. doi:10.1080/10511482.2016.1242
021.
Ross, Reginald. 2018. “Economic Impact Analysis of Proposed 10 Year Tax Abatement Adjust-
ments (2018).” City of Philadelphia. https://www.phila.gov/2018-05-24-city-releases-
study-of-10-year-property-tax-abatement/.
Ruderman, Wendy, and Barbara Laker. 2009. “Port Richmond Blames Its Splitting Headache 
on Slumlord Tactics.” Philadelphia Daily News, November, 5.
Sassen, Saskia. 2012. “Expanding the Terrain for Global Capital.” In Subprime Cities, 74–96. 
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. doi:10.1002/9781444347456.ch3.
Shell, Adam. 2005. “Renting Out a Home ’All About Numbers’.” USA Today, July, 4.
Story, Louise, and Stephanie Saul. 2015. “Stream of Foreign Wealth Flows to Elite New York 
Real Estate.” The New York Times, February. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/
nyregion/stream-of-foreign-wealth-flows-to-time-warner-condos.html.
Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. 2019a. Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real Estate Industry 
Undermined Black Homeownership. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/columbia/detail.action?docID=5889896.
———. 2019b. “Predatory Inclusion.” N+1, September. https://nplusonemag.com/issue-35/
essays/predatory-inclusion/.
Terruso, Julia. 2018. “Help for Tenants in Rental ID Bill?; A Council Plan Would Require Prop-
erty Owners to Reveal Identities. Critics Have Concerns.” The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
November, 3.
Young, Earni. 2000. “THE METER IS RUNNING COSTS SOAR AS DEVELOPERS MUST WAIT TO 
LAND THE LAND.” Philadelphia Daily News, April, 4.
———. 2004. “BOOMING NORTH PHILLY;North Philly’s RebirthCity’s Once Most Blighted Re-
gion Enjoying Unprecedented Boom.” Philadelphia Daily News, August, 5.
———. 2005a. “Surge in Rental Properties Stirs Fuss in NE.” Philadelphia Daily News, June, 2.
———. 2005b. “Out-of-Towners Tapping Hot Market;Realty Speculators Seek Profits in Phila.” 
Philadelphia Daily News, July, 4.
U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000; Summary File 1 & 3. Generated by Dare Brawley, using 
census API. https://api.census.gov/data.html 
U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2010; Summary File 1. Generated by Dare Brawley, using census 
API. https://api.census.gov/data.html U.S. Census Bureau. 
American Community Survey, 2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. Generat-
ed by Dare Brawley, using census API; https://api.census.gov/data.html 
Department of Records. “Real Estate Transfers.” Open Data Philly. Last updated October 
2019, https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/real-estate-transfers 




2000 Decennial Census, Summary File 3:
P087001  Total: Population for whom poverty status is determined  
P087002  Total: Income in 1999 below poverty level:  
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Table 2. Mean and standard deviations for all years for census tracts containing investor high 
purchase clusters compared with census tracts containing owner-occupant high purchase 
clusters
Appendix B.
